Appellant pleaded guilty second-degree criminal sexual conduct, using a minor in a sexual performance, and possession of child pornography. After a contested restitution hearing, the district court ordered Appellant to pay the victim’s mother restitution for her therapy costs and lost wages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Appellant argues that, although the restitution statute includes a child victim’s family members in the definition of “victim,” it does so only for the limited purpose of exercising duties owed to the child. He also argues the victim’s mother’s losses were not incurred as a direct result of his offenses.
Minn. Stat. § 611A.01(b) defines “victim” for restitution purposes as “a natural person who incurs loss or harm as a result of the crime.” This definition also specifically notes that “[t]he term ‘victim’ includes the family members… of a minor…” Minn. Stat § 611A.01(b). The Supreme Court finds that this sentence including family members in the definition is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The Court notes that the legislature inserted the “family member” sentence into the definition of “victim” following a case that held that a prior version of the definition applied only to family members who stepped into the victim’s shoes. See State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2004). The legislature’s response to the case indicates an intent to expand the definition of “victim.” The Court holds that the restitution statute’s definition of “victim” “creates a singular class of victims that includes the direct victims of a crime and, if the direct victim is a minor, those family members of the minor who incur a personal loss or harm as a direct result of the crime.”
As the victim’s mother in this case sufficiently proved to the district court that her losses were a natural consequence of Appellant’s offenses against her minor child, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding restitution for the victim’s mother. State v. Allison, A22- 0793, 999 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. Jan. 10, 2024).
Appellant was charged with possession of a firearm by an ineligible person after a handgun was found in the trunk of his car. At trial, he argued the gun belonged to another passenger in the car. DNA analysis from a swab of the gun showed the major DNA profile on the gun matched Appellant. Appellant argued his DNA was transferred via indirect contact, but a BCA agent testified that she would not expect an indirect contact DNA transfer to leave a major DNA profile. Appellant was convicted and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Appellant filed a postconviction petition arguing the BCA agent’s testimony was false. The State claimed his petition was procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737 (Minn. 1976), because the basis of the false testimony claim was known but not raised at the time of Appellant’s direct appeal. The district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it granted Appellant a new trial. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed.
Knaffla held that, where a direct appeal has already been taken, all matters raised in the appeal and all claims known but not raised will not be considered in a later postconviction petition, with two exceptions: (1) a novel legal issue is presented, or (2) the interests of justice require review. In this case of first impression, the Supreme Court considers what record the district court make in determining whether a claim is procedurally barred under Knaffla before granting postconviction relief.
The Court finds the district court’s failure to address the State’s properly raised Knaffla argument was an abuse of discretion. When such an argument is raised, the district court must make an explicit determination as to whether a claim is procedurally barred, with a sufficient explanation, before granting postconviction relief.
The Court concludes that Appellant’s postconviction petition was procedurally barred, because Appellant knew the substance of the BCA agent’s DNA testimony, and that it was allegedly false, at the time of his direct appeal. Gilbert v. State, A21-1560, 2024 WL 173117 (Minn. Jan. 17, 2024).
Appellant assaulted his nine-year-old niece when he was 15 years old, and a delinquency petition was filed alleging two counts of criminal sexual conduct. One count was dismissed and prosecution on the second was suspended pursuant to a continuance for dismissal (CFD) under Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 14. After multiple violations of the conditions of the CFD and extensions of the CFD period, just days before Appellant turned 19, the State moved to terminate the CFD and resume prosecution. Three months later, the district court held a CFD termination hearing at which Appellant admitted he violated the CFD agreement. During a stipulated facts trial, Appellant argued the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court ultimately adjudicated Appellant delinquent.
Generally, the district court’s juvenile jurisdiction ends when a juvenile turns 19. Minn. Stat. § 260B.193, subd. 5(a). However, the jurisdiction is extended to “conduct a trial… if: (1) an adult is alleged to have committed an offense before the adult’s 18 th birthday; and (2) a [delinquency] petition is filed… before the adult’s 21 st birthday.” Id. at subd. 5(c). Appellant argues that the district court lost all jurisdiction over the pretrial proceedings when he turned 19 and, as a CFD termination hearing is not a “trial,” the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the termination hearing after he turned 19.
The Court of Appeals finds that the only reasonable interpretation of section 260B.193 is that “conduct a trial” encompasses pretrial proceedings, including CFD termination hearings.This interpretation is supported by the plain language of section 260B.193 and Rule 14 and the interplay between the statute and rule. The district court is affirmed. In the Matter of M.A.B., A23-0752, 2024 WL 220371 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2024).
Appellant was charged with second-degree riot for organizing two intersection “takeovers,” during which vehicles and pedestrians were used to block of urban intersections to allow drivers to spin donuts while passengers hung out the spinning vehicles’ windows. The district court granted Appellant’s motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, finding no probable cause for the dangerous weapon element of the offenses. On the State’s appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed.
Second-degree riot is committed when, among other elements, a person is armed with a dangerous weapon during a riot or knows another participant is armed with a dangerous weapon. Minn. Stat. § 609.71, subd. 2. “Dangerous weapon” is defined to include any “device or instrumentality that, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm…” Id. at § 609.02, subd. 6.
The Supreme Court examines the statute’s use of “likely,” finding first that it has not been previously defined in statute or case law. Most dictionary definitions equate “likely” with anunqualified “probable” or “reasonably expected.” Based on these definitions, the Court holds that “likely” in the manner of use definition of a dangerous weapon means “probable or reasonably expected.”
Here, the district court concluded that the vehicles were not used in a manner calculated to produce death or great bodily harm but failed to address whether the vehicles were used in a manner likely to produce death or great bodily harm. Video evidence showed the spinning cars with passengers hanging out of the vehicles and in close proximity to spectators, with one video showing a vehicle strike and launch a spectator in the air. From this evidence, a reasonable juror could have concluded that death or great bodily harm was a probable or reasonably expected result. Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed the charges against Appellant for lack of probable cause. State v. Abdus-Salam, A22-1551, 2024 WL 252951 (Minn. Jan. 24, 2024).
After meeting a 14-year-old online, 38-year-old Appellant chatted with her for two months, lying about his age and engaging her in sexual conversations. The victim ran away from her mother’s house in Stearns County to a friend’s house in Benton County. Appellant picked up the victim and her friend, brought them to a hotel in Hennepin County, and had sexual intercourse with the victim. Police found the victim at her friend’s house and Appellant was later convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Among other arguments on appeal, Appellantclaims the State did not offer sufficient evidence of venue in Stearns County.
Under Minn. Stat. § 627.15, “[a] criminal action arising out of an incident of alleged child abuse may be prosecuted either in the county where the alleged abuse occurred or thecounty where the child is found.” This statute does not define “child abuse,” but the Court of Appeals looks to section 260C.007, subdivision 5, which does. This definition of “child abuse” includes third-degree criminal sexual conduct, as do the third-degree assault and first-degree murder statutes’ definitions of “child abuse.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.185(d); 609.223, subd 2. The Court holds that third-degree criminal sexual conduct qualifies as “child abuse” for determining venue. Thus, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was found in Stearns County.
Previous cases established that a child is “found,” among other options, where he or she resides. Case law also indicates a child’s residence is generally determined by the custodialparent(s). Here, because the victim resided with her mother in Stearns County, the State offered sufficient evidence to prove she was “found” in Stearns County. The Court notes that the victim’s runaway status is irrelevant, because (1) this victim was known to run away from home but always returned to her mother’s residence, and (2) as a minor, a runaway child has no authority to legally change their residence. Appellant’s conviction is affirmed. State v. Seivers, A22-0054, 2024 Wl 315609 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2024).
Appellant was in a romantic relationship with C.J. that ended contentiously. C.J. was issued an ex parte temporary harassment restraining order (HRO) against Appellant on April 30, 2020. Appellant requested a hearing, which was held on August 19, 2020. The record contains no evidence the district court issued an HRO on or after the hearing date. On August 28, 2020, C.J. reported Appellant for violating an HRO for calling her and leaving three voicemails. The State thereafter charged Appellant with stalking and three counts of violating an HRO. A jury found Appellant guilty on all counts. The Court of Appeals considers Appellant’s argument that the State failed to prove an HRO was in effect at the time of the alleged offenses.
Stalking is committed if an actor commits “two or more acts within a five-year period that violate or attempt to violate,” among other things, an HRO, the actor knows or has reason to know the acts “would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel terrorized or to fear bodily harm,” and the acts “cause this reaction” by the victim. Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) and (b). To prove a violation of an HRO, the State must prove an order was in effect, the actor knew of the order, and the actor violated the order. Id. at § 609.748, subd. 6(b).
When a petition for an HRO is filed, the respondent may request a hearing. Id. at subd. 4(e). If a temporary HRO was ordered prior to the hearing, the temporary HRO remains “in effect until a hearing is held on the issuance of a restraining order…” Id. at subd. 4(d). The Court examines the meaning of “until” as used in subdivision 4(d). The most common dictionary definition is “up to the time of.” The Court notes that subdivision 4(b) provides that a temporary HRO becomes effective upon the referee’s signature, which the Court finds makes it apparent that subdivision 4(d) specifies when a temporary HRO ceases to be effective. Moreover, practically speaking, an HRO hearing is to determine if a petitioner is entitled to an HRO. If a hearing is held and the petitioner does not establish reasonable grounds for an HRO, there is no reason for a temporary HRO to remain in effect.
In this case, no HRO was issued after the hearing on C.J.’s harassment petition. Thus, when Appellant contacted C.J. three times after the hearing date, there was no HRO in place. As such, the evidence was insufficient to support Appellant’s convictions. State v. Ickler, A22-0079, 2024 WL 315611 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2024).
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